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A SUGGESTED LOCUS OF RECOVERY IN NATIONAL
EXCHANGE VIOLATIONS OF RULE lOb-5
SEC rule lOb-5 1 requires the insider who uses material, undisclosed corporate information for personal gain by trading in the corporation's securities to surrender his profit.2 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.3 is the first decision under rule lOb-5 to hold insiders liable for
the return of profits gained through the use of inside information in
a national exchange transaction. In reversing the lower court decision
in part, the Second Circuit held that certain defendants were in violation of rule lOb-5 when, with knowledge of a favorable initial core
drilling of mining property, they purchased company stock in national
exchange transactions. 4 The rule has thus become a potent sanction
against insider nondisclosure trading, providing a wide base of liability. But neither the rule nor Texas Gulf Sulphur indicates who
takes or how much is taken of the surrendered profit when the trades
were on a national exchange. 5 Should there be some sort of private
recovery? Should derivative recovery by the corporation be allowed?
Or should there be some alternative allocation? 6 The policy considera1 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968). The rule was issued by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
2Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E-D. Pa. 1947).
3 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 5 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP'.
92,251 (2d Cir. Aug. 13,
1968).
4 Id. at 97,180-81.
5 See Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the "Texas Gulf Sulphur" Proceeding, 51 VA. L. Rxv. 1271, 1299-1300 (1965).
Texas Gulf's liability for the misrepresentation of its press release and the liability of
the recipients of either stock options or insiders' tips is beyond the scope of this note.
6 Concerning the individual defendants in Texas Gulf, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 5 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,251 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968):
At least 49 private actions are now pending in this court against TGS, defendants named in the Commission's action, and others, arising out of the transactions which are the subject matter of the Commission's action. Some 16 of these
are individual actions, 31 are said to be class actions, and one is a derivative action. At least 475 persons are included as plaintiffs. While many of the complaints
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tions behind both the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 and the civil
remedy created by judicial expansion of rule lOb-58 are relevant to the
inquiry.
A. Individual Recovery
Under the common law majority rule, the insider has no affirmative duty of disclosure to the selling shareholder 0 In those states which
follow the minority or special circumstances rule,10 private recovery
from the insider is allowed on a theory of breach of fiduciary duty.I
But such individual recovery for nondisclosure has been limited to
12
cases where both privity and reliance have been proven.
In cases where damages have been incurred in a face-to-face transaction, rule lOb-5 has been interpreted to provide a civil remedy: 3
Courts have used the rule to escape the strict privity requirements for
individual recovery, and reliance has been readily found. 14
The rationale for allowing private recovery in the face-to-face situation is simply not applicable to the national exchange transaction. 15
do not specify damages claimed, others, in the aggregate, claim compensatory damages in excess of $2,800,000 and punitive damages in excess of $77,000,000.
258 F. Supp. at 267 n.1. See also Klein, The Extension of a Private Remedy to Defrauded
Securities Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 20 U. MwnM L. Rzv. 81, 110-12 (1965), for an
analysis of the problem.
7 See, e.g., H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934); Hearings on Proposed
Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I,
at 8-30 (1942).
8 See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
9 H. HENN, COPXORATxONS § 240, at 378 (1961); Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Cor-

porate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CoRm. L.Q. 53, 54 & n.5 (1960).
10 HENN, supra note 9, at 378-79.
'1 Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (Ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 627, 662 (1963).
12 Gladstone v. Murray Co., 314 Mass. 584, 587, 50 N.E.2d 958, 960 (1945); Goodwin
v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 361-63, 186 N.E. 659, 660-61 (1933); HENN, supra note 9, at 379.
See Conant, supra note 9, at 59; Ruder, supra note 11, at 674-82.
1a See cases cited note 8 supra.
14 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965); Cochran v. Channing
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Telev. Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). But see
3 L. Loss, SacuarrnEs RaGULATION 1767-70 (2d ed. 1961).

15 See, e.g., Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Individual investors cannot readily determine whether any of their transactions were in fact
executed with insiders. In the typical situation, brokerage houses do not exchange stock
certificates on a transaction basis; rather, at the end of the day totals are calculated by a
clearing house and certificates are transferred on paper to the account of the net pur-
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If there is no knowledge that an insider is buying, private recovery on
the basis of after-acquired knowledge would amount to a windfall, since
insider inactivity would not have precluded the investor's loss. 16 Such
fortuitous recovery should be disallowed unless it is determined that
7
Congress intended to implement securities policy in this manner.'
There would also be certain administrative problems in determining who should share in the surrendered profit, since a listed stock
buffeted by rumors would be actively traded before, during and after
the insider activity, Two possible alternatives could be followed: ascertainment of the specific shares which contributed to insider profit; or
allowance of class recovery on the part of all who traded inthe security
during the period of insider activity.' 8 If the former technique could
be adopted practically, 19 certain sellers would receive a windfall based
on the insider's wrongful use of information; the nondisclosure, after
all, was equally prejudicial to the other uninformed traders who sold
20
during that period.
If class recovery were allowed, traders would be compensated for
the same mistakes they would have made absent any insider activity.
When the release of information would harm the corporation, insiders
have the dual duty to refrain from trading and to remain silent concerning the corporate information. 21 Breach of the first injures neither
the class nor the individual. In fact, market factors indicate that insider
purchasing activity cannot adversely affect sellers who have placed sell
orders at a given price, anid the activity increases the price received by
those selling at the market price. 22 Conversely, inactivity depreses the
chasers. Soon even this process will be eliminated by computerized transactions. See 1
SEC, REPORT ON THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECUPITIES MARKETS pt. 2, At 40-42 (1963). However,
some brokerage houses do offer to disclose the exact time of the transaction and the
broker on the opposite side. See standard transaction confirmation form, Loeb, Rhoades
& Co.
16 Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10b and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Y'r L.J. 658, 674-79 (1965).
17 Id. at 679.
18 See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 967 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 5 CCH FED. L. REP,
99,251 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968);
Klein, supra note 6, at 111.
19 For a discussion of the reasons fQr this choice, sch as the seller's reliance on
silence, see Fleischer, supra note 5, at 1298.
20 Note, supra note 16, at 675-70.
21 See Henkel, Codification-Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 29
Bus. LAw. 866 (1967); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECUTMIES RELATIoNs 958 (2d ea. 1968);
Note, supra note 16, at 675.
22 Address by Mr. Jack M. Whitney, 11, ABA Comm. on Fed, Reg. of Securities,
Aug. 11, 1965, reprinted in 21 Bus. LAW. 198 (1965). But Toe Fleischer, suprq note 5, at
1296-98.
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sales price received by those trading at the market price, and does not
guarantee that the sell orders at fixed prices will remain unexecuted
until the favorable information is released.
The magnitude of the potential administrative problem is staggering under the first solution since judicial proceedings would be required for an investor to determine whether he actually sold to the
insider2 3 Confirmation of such a sale would be entirely fortuitous with
no degree of predictability. Although less cumbersome to administer,
the class action has the inherent disadvantage of spreading the recovery
so thin (especially in a heavily traded stock) that the remedy becomes
nearly worthless to the individual. 24 The problem of determining the
extent of the class remains. Should it include only those who sold on
the day or hour of insider purchase, or should it include those who
25
sold during the full period of nondisclosure?
If private recovery of the insider's national exchange profits were
allowed under rule lOb-5, several related problems would arise. Where
the seller immediately reinvests the sale proceeds at a profit, will recovery be mitigated? If mitigation is held applicable upon whom
should the burden of proof fall? Finally, will the insider be faced with
liability greater than the amount of his profit if the paper profit is
greater than his realized profit?
Since Congress has chosen the policy of forcing the insider to surrender his profits in order to preserve the integity of the securities
markets, 26 disposition of the surrendered profit should serve the same
purpose. Individual windfall recoveries do not serve the purpose of
preserving market integrity.
B. Corporate Recovery
Congressional policy in enacting section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act of 193427 was to allow corporate recovery of short-swing
23 This difficulty would be surmounted if the SEC is permitted, as in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, to demand restitution on behalf of defrauded investors who are not parties to
the litigation. This procedure may be open to attack. Fleischer, supra note 5, at 1297 n.126.
24 The class action becomes less unattractive if the SEc bears the expense of investigation and litigates on behalf of the notified parties who decide not to opt out. See 3
Loss, supra note 14, at 1824.
25 See generally id. at 1819-1924. See also note 15 supra.
26 See Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 289, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Speed V.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). See generally Ruder, supra note 11.
27 Section 16(b) reads as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from anly purchase and sale, or
any sale and purchase, of any equity sedirity bi such istaer (other than an ex-
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insider profits in order to curb potential abuse of market integrity.2
If an officer, director, or beneficial owner of ten percent or more of
the corporation's stock sells shares within six months of purchase, the
profit is recoverable by the corporation in a derivative action under
section 16b. 29 0Only the holding period need be shown; intent and use
of inside information are immaterial. On the other hand, because stock
acquisition programs of a long-term nature are favored,8 0 the rule
1Ob-5 sanction requires proof of the use of material, undisclosed information in making the purchase.
Both the remedy of corporate recovery and the sanction of profit
surrender serve the purpose of preserving market integrity. Profit surrender eliminates the unfair advantage of the insider vis-4-vis the investor with regard to corporate information. Corporate recovery of
surrendered profit encourages investment because those who remain
shareholders are benefited, and those who sold are not harmed; meanwhile the courts and exchanges are spared the administrative turmoil
caused by individual sellers seeking recovery. The remedy chosen by
Congress under section 16b appears to be the appropriate one in most
rule 1Ob-5 insider nondisclosure actions.
empted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security
was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the
part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction
of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a
period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner
of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fall
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought
more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall
not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the
security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of
this subsection.
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). The omission of express mention of corporate recovery in § 10(b), in view of its inclusion in § 16(b), does not necessarily mean
that such a remedy should be denied. No remedy is expressly provided by § 10(b) or
rule lOb-5; individual recovery is a judicially created remedy. See Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802-03 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In the appropriate case, and Texas
Gulf Sulphur fits the description, the courts, therefore, should be free to utilize a congressionally approved remedy such as corporate recovery.
28 See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1934) (21 vols.).
29 See Lowenfels, Section 16b: A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CoRNELL L. Rxv. 45 (1968).
80 See generally NEw YoRr. STocK EXCRANGE, TnE CoRmoRATE DmEarOR AND THE INVsrNO PUBLIC 11 (1965); Henkel, supra note 21.
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In addition to congressional approval of corporate recovery in a
section 16b situation, there are strong arguments by analogy to state
law that the corporation whose shares are involved in wrongful insider
trading should receive the profit. Fiduciary principles dictate that when
an agent profits by using inside information concerning the affairs of
his principal, his profit should go to the principal.3 1 Corporate recovery of insider profits on a national exchange transaction based on the
breach of fiduciary duty was allowed in Brophy v. Cities Service Co. 3 2
There the defendant was a corporate employee who bought company
stock with knowledge that the plaintiff-corporation was to initiate a
buying program in its own shares. The court held that a cause of action is stated when it is alleged that an employee in a fiduciary position used confidential information to his own profit. Although the
holding was based on the special circumstance that the company was
interested in the purchase of its own stock, the court significantly noted
in dictum that it is not necessary for the plaintiff-corporation to allege
financial loss to maintain the action.33 The allegation is unnecessary
because public policy requires that the employee be held accountable
to his corporation for profits gained through the breach of fiduciary
34
duty.
A recent New York decision, Diamond v. Oreamuno,35 allowed
corporate recovery in a derivative action against a director who purchased shares on a national exchange. Applying New York law, the
court found inside information a corporate asset, holding that the
trading in securities was only a vehicle by which such a corporate asset
could be converted. 0 Whether corporate recovery of national exchange
profits under rule lOb-5 is based on breach of fiduciary duty or on
conversion of a corporate asset,37 the result would be in keeping with
the policy of section 16b.38 Such recovery is preferable to private re31 HENN, supra note 9, at 566; H. MANNE,
19 (1966).
82 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949).
33 Id. at 243, 70 A.2d at 7.

INsiDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MAKEr

34 Id.
35 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Ist Dep't 1968).
36 Id. at 288, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04. See Conant, supra note 9, cited in Diamond, in
which Conant eight years previously advocated the "corporate asset" theory.
37 Conversion of a corporate asset would be the broader basis of liability since recovery would not be limited to actions against an insider, but would be available against
anyone who has converted the asset. Liability of those receiving tips would be more
readily established under this theory.
38 But see Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), in which the Court, narrowly reading
the statute, refused to expand the applicability of the § 16(b) sanction. This does not
necessarily preclude the use of the § 16(b) remedy in the framework of rule lOb-5.
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covery without the elements of privity, reliance, causation, or even

demonstrable financial loss.39
There ate, however, possible abuses inhering in corporate recovery under rule lOb-5. Firstj the insider may benefit from his own wrong.
For example, if he is a substantial stockholder, corporate recovery will
be to his benefit. Second, director profit-making might be looked upon
favorably by the closely held corporation unconcerned with its public
image; the director of such a corporation may not be deterred by the
chance of being caught if his illicit profit is merely deposited in corporate coffers. This potential for abuse is, nevertheless no greater than
under section 16b, and where such abuse occurs, an alternative remedy would be appropriate
C. Alternative Remedy

An alternative to corporate recovery should be adopted on a dear
showing of abuse of recovery provisions. 40 In such a case the corporation should not be allowed recoveryj and sanctions such as fines and

removal (either temporary or permanent) from national exchange listing should be imposed. One proposal which deserves congressional
scrutiny is that insider profits should be used to help pay for SEC investigations of securities abuses. 41 A comprehensive national securities
indemnity fund, administered in a manner similar to Federal Deposit
Insurance in the banking field, should also be considered. If individual
investors are defrauded and pre-Texas Gulf Sulphur federal securities

laws provide a right to recovery, the indemnity fund would reimburse
the investors for damages uncollectable after judgment. Rights to the
judgment would be assigned to the SEC which would, if possible, en89 Conant, stpr'a note 9. See 80 HAiv L. Riv, 468, 476-16 (1966). Cf, 2 SEC, REPORT
SEcurTIns MAus pt. 3, at 96 (1963).

ON THE SPECIAL STUDY OF

40 The antifraud sanctions of rule lOb-5 should provide a basis for preventing corporate abuse of the recovery provisions. The more closely held the corporation, the greater
is the danger of abuse of corporate recovery. A point must be delineated beyond which a
corporation becomes so closely held that corporate recovery of insider profits would be
antithetical to federal securities law policies.
When a corporation, by purchasing its own shares over hatiotal exchanges, favors
one group of shareholders over another, the newly enacted § 13(e)l of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-439 (July 29, 1968), 82 Stat. 454, U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NMws 2769 (1968), 8hould provide an appropriate remedy.
41 Such an alternative should also be available in cases of § 16(b) abuse, This alternative Will not necessarily foster a marked increase in SEC activity for two reasons. First,
the fund would not necessarily be large. Second, political considerations would prevent
the Cotnnission froth using stdic a ptovisiOri to stifle legitimate corporate activities. Fears
Of SEC domination Of 4 couittolled market Would be alla-yed by the strong political pressures aVailable tO cbuhteract overaggtessive administrttive tendencide.
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force it for the benefit of the fund at a later date. Investor confidence
in national securities markets would certainly be bolstered by the creation of such a fund.
CONCLUSION

Unless Congress acts to clarify the duties of insiders, courts will
probably expand the interpretation of rule lOb-5 to control insider
disclosure responsibilities and trading practices. 4 An expansion of rule
l0b-5 sanctions, as in Texas Gulf Sulphur, magnifies the problem of
dispensing the recovery, And the need for established standards for
insider trading is matched by the need for established standards for recovery.
The examples of section 16b and of well reasoned common law
decisions should be followed to award the profit in most situations to
the corporation. However, there are situations in which corporate recovery of profits would be unjustified; the courts should then have the
alternative of awarding the full amount to an indemnity fund to be
administered by the SEC. Such a fund could be used for a variety of
purposes in keeping with the legislative intent to maintain public confidence in the securities market.
Of course, Texas Gulf Sulphur may signal the beginning of the
end of judicial expansion of rule !Ob5. If the nondisclosure remedy
is expanded to afford a private recovery in the national exchange transaction, the resulting judicial and administrative chaos may force congressional evaluation of the rule.
Barry R. Lonche
42 See Nmv YORK SToci EXCiANGE, THE CORPORATE DnmaroR AND THE INVESTING PUBuc 45 (1965).

